Funny stuff. Full article here. Not sure I have anything I can add to this...
But a whole lot of these loans that are failing right now were originated as 100% CLTV stated-income loans, because the guidelines agreed to by the issuer allowed that. I am scratching my head over the logic here: I spent most of the early years of this decade, just as a for instance, blowing my blood pressure to danger levels every time I looked at the underwriting guidelines published by ALS, the correspondent lending division of Lehman. ALS was a leader in the 100% stated income Alt-A junk. And I kept having to look at them because my own Account Executives keep shoving them under my nose and demanding to know how come we can't do that if ALS does it. I'd try something like "because we're not that stupid," and what I'd get is this: "But if ALS can sell those loans, so can we. All we gotta do is rep and warrant that they meet guidelines that Wall Street is dumb enough to publish." Every lender in the boom who sold to the street wrote loans it knew were absurd, but in fact they had been given absurd guidelines to write to. What on earth good did it do to have those originators represent and warrant that they followed underwriting guidelines to the letter, when those guidelines allowed stated income 100% financing on a toxic ARM with a prepayment penalty?
Starting in 2007, investors rapidly pulled out of the 2/28 ARM subprime product. They just announced they wouldn't buy it any longer. And it went away. You do not have a bunch of mortgage brokers still selling 2/28s to borrowers, or correspondent lenders still throwing 2/28s into new securitizations. As you might have noticed, you don't have new securitizations. You always had the power to click your heels together three times andIl poker texas holdem online è un gioco di carte. return to the land of just not buying the paper, but I guess you didn't know that until the pink witch showed up.
And you will note that what immediately happened after you all stopped agreeing to those goofball underwriting guidelines was that a bunch of marginal originators immediately went belly-up. That's all the business they could get: writing junk paper for foolish investors. You put them out of business. You should not be sorry about that, except for the part about how you did business with them for so long that now you might have a bunch of worthless contractual warranties. This is called learning by doing. The solution to it is not to go back to buying any old dumb loan that you can get someone to offer a warranty on.