Posts filed under Finance

Map of Misery

Businessweek's Map of Misery shows us the percent of option loans by state. Look at California!

From Nightmare Mortgages from Sept 06.

Great read to see the type of mortgage junk that was being underwritten, though the article gets the wrong conclusion (investors won't be hurt).

Monday morning quarterback quote (emphasis mine)

""It's certainly reasonable to expect to see some excesses wrung out," says Brad A. Morrice, president and CEO of New Century Financial Corp. But even here the damage will likely be limited."

From Calculated Risk

Posted on March 16, 2007 and filed under Finance.

Why Did Underwriting Standards Deteriorate?

Three reasons: 1. Lazy, new investors 2. The *perceived* reduction of risk brought on by financial complexity / precision and engineering 3. Fragmentation of the value chain.

The first coherent explanation of this is at: Calculated Risk, halfway down the page

Probably the big innovation that the GSEs had on the market for mortgage-backed securities, back in the day, was their process of selecting homogenous and uniform loans for their security pools. If you can create a set of rules—underwriting guidelines, product features, appraisal rules, all the way down to very detailed requirements for legal documents, property and title insurance, etc.—and make sure all loans fall within those rules, you can build a security with a fairly high degree of confidence in the assumptions about delinquency, default, prepayment, enforceability of legal rights in the event of foreclosure, and so on. This allowed the agencies to create reliable calculations for the guarantee fee they would need to charge the lenders in order to cover the credit risks of the pools; it also made it possible for various kinds of institutional and depository investors to buy those securities in a market that could establish apples-to-apples prices for them. The regulators of depository institutions had already reviewed the GSE guidelines, as it were, and given their general approval to such standards; the depository didn’t have to wade through a 400-page prospectus for each deal. GSE loans became the vanilla ice cream of the mortgage world.

Of course no one ever claimed that only GSE-style loans were worth making. First, of course, the GSEs by charter were limited to moderately-sized loans, and so there was always a segment of the market—the jumbo market—that was simply outside the GSE sandbox for charter reasons. Also, there have always been all sorts of near misses, one-offs, unique deals, and so on, that are certainly loans worth making, but that just can’t go to the GSEs; banks generally held these in their investment portfolios. Again, although it’s possible that such loans are of weaker credit quality than the GSE standards, it’s also possible that they’re more or less equivalent, if you go to all the trouble of wading through all the variables and risk layers and coming up with a total. The idea of GSE MBS was simply that neither investors nor the GSE’s buy side staff would have to do any “wading,” as an efficiency issue as much as anything else, and that prices for those securities could be set with a lot less fuss. There is of course a huge value to efficiency, if you’re trying to run a trillion-dollar securities market, but it was never intended to be the last word in credit quality.

So the big problem with “Alt-A,” from the beginning to right at the moment, was and is that you have to wade into the weeds. A lot. Much of the cries of outraged innocence we’re hearing lately from some investors stems from the fact that they didn’t wade very deeply into the loans underlying the securities they bought. There are lots of reasons for this; to my mind, the biggest one is that a bunch of people seemed to think that one could invest in Alt-A pools at the same operational cost as GSE MBS. But, of course, that’s missing the whole point. In any case, investors became more and more reliant on the rating agencies, whose job was largely to build models that would take these risk-layered loans and end up slapping some overall credit designation on the pool or the security or a tranche thereof. Many folks, right about now, are taking the rating agencies to the woodshed over some of the assumptions in those models and the rating agencies’ apparent inability to react (downgrade) fast enough when new data on performance catches up with some of these loan products underlying these pools. I can’t argue with the critics of the rating agencies in the specifics. On the other hand, I find myself chuckling a little—in a cynical way—over the underlying problem here. For the rating agencies to become fully effective modelers and predictors of credit risk for Alt-A is, at some level, for them to reinvent a certain wheel that the GSEs invented a generation or more ago on the “conforming” side. In other words, we’re expecting the rating agencies to homogenize the heterogeneous so that bond buyers can trade RMBS without doing all that wading and paying all those analysts and complicating all those VaR models. We want mocha java praline mango on a sugar cone at vanilla levels of efficiency.

Theoretically, that can be done—one can build guidelines and other requirements that standardize the Alt-A world fairly reliably, or at least break it down further into somewhat more homogeneous sub-classes—but I confess to being surprised that anyone thinks the rating agencies are the parties to do it. The GSEs were not simply standardizing other people’s loans: they were the buyer, the one on the hook for the credit guarantees, the party of the big risk kahuna. (So were/are the mortgage insurers, which is why you see a whole lot of overlap between MI and GSE credit guidelines.) I’m not sure what other people expect by asking fee-based rating agencies who are not owners of the risk to get in there and standardize the Alt-A market, but what I expect is not very much. My own view is that being on the hook in the event of default tends to concentrate the mind in ways that making fees off of the volume of securities issued does not. Call me cynical if you want, but I think I’m just making a pretty obvious point about how risk works.

So why, you ask, are not the real risk-owners—the buy-side Wall Street firms and big originators who invest in or securitize Alt-A—making it an efficient and standardized market? Well, because it’s a competitive market. Those who like to complain about the GSEs being “monopolies” like to imply that the more competition in the mortgage marketplace, the better things will be. I have my doubts about some of that for lots of reasons, but I will note that the other side of “monopoly” is homogeneity, efficiency, and transparency to the investor (at least as far as the underlying loans are concerned; I’m not talking about GSE accounting practices here. In fact I have no objection to FASB holding a “monopoly” on accounting standards, to make a related point.) Once “competing” products or loans or security issues enter the marketplace, by definition the things can’t just be more of the same. In a marketplace unprepared to do the analysis, due diligence, and complex price-modeling on these “competing products,” it became, after the dust settled, a fairly predictable question of the highest apparent yield getting the most bids. Anyway, one reliable sign that there’s a bubble going on is not so much the repeated statement that “it’s different this time,” but the repeated habit of using “the same” analytical or due diligence or pricing tools on what is clearly not “the same” precisely because it was marketed to you in the first place as “not the same old same old.” I cannot help offering a general “duh” here to certain institutional investors who have just discovered something that was hidden in plain sight.

Posted on March 14, 2007 and filed under Finance.

How Much Mortgage Junk is Out There?

Why we have a long way to go: This will keep us busy in 07/08. Some large percentage of these homeowners were counting on a refi in 07 based on home price appreciation to get into a better product and will not be able to pay the reset payments. With flat/falling housing prices and tighter credit, this ain't happening and as people start to go delinquent over the next 12-15 months, the cycle will be self-sustaining.

And this year $1 trillion in adjustable-rate mortgages are due to reset before Dec. 31.

San Diego Union Tribune

And this will keep us busy in 08/09 since 2006 might have been the worst year of all and the fallout of these loans will go into late 08/09

In 2006, according to UBS, interest- only loans, 40-year mortgages and option-adjustable-rate mortgages comprised more than 75 percent of Alt-A issuance. These loans often have little documentation of a borrower's income and rack up higher mortgage debt against the value of the underlying collateral (i.e., the house). UBS said that 76 percent of adjustable-rate interest- only loans written in 2006 had low documentation, while 57 percent had loan-to-value ratios greater than 80 percent. No surprise, then, that 3.16 percent of these loans are already delinquent by two months or more.

From the IHT

And from CSFB, more exciting data on Alt-A

The overall share of prime conventional loans has declined from an estimated 66% of total purchase dollar originations in 2002 to 45% last year. The GSEs’ share loss has been largely attributed to the proliferation of “exotic” mortgage products such as high CLTV loans, low/no documentation mortgages and interest-only/negative amortization loans, which the GSEs have typically chosen to limit their exposure to given the high risk profiles of these products.

[T]he Alt-A market has expanded from just 5% of total originations in 2002 to approximately 20% in 2006. Although the credit profile of Alt-A borrowers is stronger than that of the subprime market (717 average FICO score for Alt-A borrowers versus 646 for subprime), we believe that there is considerable risk associated with the lax underwriting standards and exotic mortgage products utilized in this segment of the market in recent years, both in the form of continued credit deterioration and reduced incremental demand resulting from tightening lending standards.

• The combined loan to value on Alt-A purchase originations was 88% in 2006, with 55% of homebuyers taking out simultaneous seconds (piggybacks) at the time of purchase.

• Low/no documentation loans (stated income loans) represented a staggering 81% of total Alt-A purchase originations in 2006, up significantly from 64% just two years earlier. . . .

• Interest only and option ARM loans represented approximately 62% of Alt-A purchase originations in 2006.

• . . . 1-year hybrid ARMs represented approximately 28% of Alt-A purchase originations in 2006, setting the stage for considerable reset risk.

• Investors and second home buyers represented 22% of Alt-A purchase originations last year, which is the largest non-owner occupied share among the various segments of the mortgage market.

In the past five years, subprime purchase originations have more than doubled in share to approximately 20% of the total in 2006. Over this time period, subprime lenders eased underwriting standards in an effort to gain market share. . . . . In the third quarter of 2006, the Mortgage Bankers’ Association reported that 12.6% of subprime loans were delinquent.

• 2006 subprime purchase originations posted an alarming 94% combined loan-to-value, on an average loan price of nearly $200,000.

• Roughly 50% of all subprime borrowers in the past two years have provided limited documentation regarding their incomes.

• In 2006, 2/28 ARMs represented roughly 78% of all subprime purchase originations according to data from Loan Performance. According to our contacts, homebuyers were primarily qualified at the introductory teaser rate rather than the fully amortizing rate, which for many buyers was the main reason they were even qualified in the first place.

All from Calculated Risk

Posted on March 14, 2007 and filed under Finance.